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THE ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL:
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR
J. T. HOLMES AND E. ROVET*
I GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The study done by Professor S. R. Peck on judicial behaviour in the
Canadian Supreme Court,' while following theories and methods initiated
earlier by American political behaviouralists, was ground-breaking in this
country and aroused a great deal of interest among both members of the legal
profession and the judiciary. There was some criticism2 but, in general, the
reception of the study was encouraging.
In the United States such work has been confined to an examination of
judicial behaviour at the Supreme Court and appellate court levels. This
paper arose out of a desire to apply the methods used in those studies to an
examination of the most important appellate court in Canada-the Ontario
Court of Appeal.
Both in number and types of cases heard, the Ontario Court of Appeal
very much resembles the New York Court of Appeal in the hierarchy of
national courts. The comparison can be extended by realizing that the court
is situated in the most heavily populated and industrialized province in
Canada. For these and a variety of other reasons, this court seemed to
warrant further study.
II SCALOGRAM ANALYSIS
Scalogram analysis is a research technique developed by the social psy-
chologists to measure the attitudes of subjects toward social objects and to
locate the subjects on an attitudinal continuum. Social psychologists have
endeavoured to measure attitudes of subjects by asking them to respond
affirmatively or negatively to a series of statements or questions relating to a
particular social object. Each statement represents a more favourable attitude
toward the object than the one which precedes it. By assigning to each subject
the number of the last statement to which he responds affirmatively, they are
able to compare the attitude of each subject with those of the others. It is
assumed that each subject who responds affirmatively to any statement will
*J. T. Holmes, LL.B. Osgoode, and E. Rovet, LL.B. Osgoode, were members of the 1969
graduating class.
I S. R. Peck, The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966: A Search for Policy
Through Scalogram Analysis (1967), 45 CAN. B. REV. 668-671.
2Chitty, Sniping At The Judiciary (1968), 16 CnrrrY's LAW JoURNA. 74.
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respond affirmatively to all statements which precede it and that each subject
who responds negatively to any statement will respond negatively to all state-
ments which follow it. If responses meet these conditions, they are said to be
consistent; whereas if they do not, they are said to be inconsistent. When no
inconsistencies occur in the responses, it is assumed that all the statements
relate to the attitude under investigation and are therefore said to be unidi-
mensional. When an inconsistency occurs, however, it may indicate that the
response relates to an attitude other than the one under investigation.
Guttman designed a scale which establishes the unidimensionality of the
statements on it. He accepted as scalable, statements on a scale on which at
least 90% of the responses are consistent. Scalability is taken as evidence
that the statements are unidimensional. Guttman developed a formula which
indicates in a decimal form the percentage of consistency. Therefore, if the
percentage of consistency is 90% or greater, the statements are scalable. And
the social psychologist concludes that the statements are unidimensional and
that the responses are determined by the attitude under investigation. Such
a series of statements may be used to locate each subject on an attitudinal
continuum.3
American judicial behaviouralists have adapted the technique of scalo-
gram analysis for use in the examination of judicial decisions. The procedure
followed may be briefly outlined as follows:
(a) They assume that judicial decisions are determined by the justices'
attitudes toward policy issues.
(b) Each divided case raising a particular policy issue is regarded as
asking a question.
(c) The justices' votes and not their reasons for judgment are taken to
be their responses to the questions asked.
(d) The vote of each justice is classified as affirmative or negative in
terms of the attitude which is the subject matter of the assumption.
(e) The cases raising the particular policy issue are arranged vertically
in order of affirmative votes cast in each case.
(f) The justices are arranged horizontally in accordance with the position
on the scale of the last affirmative vote cast by each justice.
Guttman's formula is used to determine whether or not a scale evidences
unidimensionality. If it does, they conclude that all the justices reach their
decisions in the cases on the basis of their attitudes toward the policy issue.
4
An attempt was made to use the scalogram analysis technique, as adapted
by the American judicial behaviouralists, to investigate the work of the
Ontario Court of Appeal. Although Professor Peck's use of scalogram
analysis to investigate the work of the Supreme Court of Canada resulted in
considerable success, no such claim can be made with respect to any study
of the Ontario Court of Appeal. A brief comparison of the two attempts is
sufficient to illustrate the difficulties encountered with the Ontario Court of
Appeal. The following comparisons may be made:
s The foregoing is merely a pr~cis of part of an article written by Peck, supra,
note 1.
4 For a fuller explanation, see Peck, supra, note 1, at 671-674.
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(a) The Court of Appeal consists of 10 members, whereas the Supreme
Court consists of 9 members.
(b) Although both courts sit in shifting panels, the Supreme Court sits
in panels of 5, 7 and 9, whereas the Court of Appeal sat in panels
of 3, ninety per cent of the time and in panels of 5, ten per cent
of the time.
(c) A total of 295 votes were cast in the Court of Appeal cases selected
for review. If a full panel of ten justices had participated in each of
these cases, 920 votes would have been cast. Accordingly, 625 "non-
participations" resulted from the court's practice of sitting in panels
(68%). In comparison, a total of 463 votes were cast in the
Supreme Court cases selected for review. If a full panel of nine
justices had participated in each of these cases, 765 votes would
have been cast. Accordingly, only 293 "non-participations" resulted
from the court's practice of sitting in panels (39%).
(d) Although additional non-participations resulted from the inclusion
on each scale of a column for any justice who was on the court at
any time during the period under review, there were only twelve
justices on the Supreme Court, whereas there were sixteen on the
Court of Appeal.
It can be seen from this comparison that non-participation in the
Ontario Court of Appeal was almost double that in the Supreme Court of
Canada.5 Consequently, it was felt that the application of the scalogram
analysis technique would not result in a meaningful description of justices'
attitudes toward policy issues. It should be noted, however, that it was found
possible to "scale" decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal as evidenced by
Table I.
This "scalogram" conforms to Peck's scalograms in that it evidences
unidimensionality upon an application of Guttman's formula. It also conforms
in that the justices are arranged from left to right in accordance with each
justice's break-point. The "break-point" is the point at which a justice ceases
to vote consistently affirmative and begins to vote consistently negative. The
lower a justice's break-point, the closer to the left he will be. It deviates from
Peck's scalograms in that cases are not arranged vertically in order of the
number of affirmative votes cast in each case.
On the basis of his voting division, a justice may be classified as highly
in favour of the affirmative value (if he votes affirmatively in 80% to 100%
of the cases in which he participates), in favour of the affirmative value (60 to
79%), neutral (41 to 59%), in favour of the negative value (20 to 40%),
or highly in favour of the negative value (0 to 20% ).6 In this way, it is
possible to describe the effect of the justices' votes. The three areas which
were selected for review are as follows:
(a) criminal law appeals;
(b) administrative law appeals;
(c) "economic underdog" appeals.
7
5 Peck expressed concern over 39% non-participation.
6 Peck, supra, note 1, at 679.
1The decision as to which cases belonged to each group of appeals was, to some
extent, subjective. Only the headnotes were looked at.
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TABLE I
JUDGES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
CASES W j
Beamish 68 1 5
Coles 65 1 557
Watson 68 1 279
George 64 2 429
Yuhasz 60 251
Lelievre 62 522
Kerim (1962) 38 C.R. 71
Hilson 58 665
Antley 64 1 545
Patterson 67 1 429
Michel 68 2 68
Yolles 59 206
Black 66 1 683
Cipolla 65 2 673
Roberts 63 1 280
Varley 59 507
Simpson 59 497
Wilkins 64 2 365
Kribs 60 184
Worrall 65 1 527
De Clercq 66 1 674
Horsburgh 66 1 739
Briden 60 362
Cooper 68 1 71
Bruno Peda June 20, 1968
Strand June 4, 1968









+ (-) + + +1
(-) (-) + + +
+-- -
(-)
+ + -- -
+ + + +_+ -)-
+ +




atti 66 1 379
ampbell 64 2 487 + M-(+) -
ezeau 58 617 + 1---- -
he C.B.C. 58 55 +- (+)
ameron 66 2 777 + - - - -
unbeam 67 1 661 + - - - -
Iaurantonio 68 1 145 + -
IcConnell 67 2 527 +
# 3 10 4 3 4 5 1 1 7 4 4 5 1 1 0 0
- 0 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 8 7 14 20 4 5 2 1
Participations 3 11 5 4 6 8 2 2 15 11 18 25 5 6 2 1
= 124
Brackets indicate inconsistent votes.
W = Wells, Las = Laskin, Lai = Laidlaw, K = Kelly, Leb = Lebel, R = Roach, Mor = Morden, A =
Aylesworth, McL = McLennan, S = Schroeder, P = Porter, Mac = MacKay, Gib = Gibson, McG
McGillivray, E = Evans, J = Jessup.
68 1 5 = [1968] 1 O.R. 5
[VOL. 7, NO. I
1969] Supreme Court Review





Beamish 68 1 5
Coles 65 1 557
Watson 68 1 279
George 64 2 429
Yuhasz 60 251
Lelievre 62 522
Kerim (1962) 38 C.R. 71
Hilson 58 665
Antley 64 1 545
Patterson 67 1 429
Michel 68 2 68
Yolles 59 206
Black 66 1 683
Cipolla 65 2 673
Roberts 63 1 280
Varley 59 507
Simpson 59 497
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Price June 17, 1968
Tatti 66 1 379
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The C.B.C. 58 55
Cameron 66 2 777
Sunbeam 67 1 661
Maurantanio 68 1 145
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Thirty-five divided decisions in appeals arising under the Criminal Code
and other legislation creating criminal offences, reported in the 1958 to 1968
volumes of the Ontario Reports8 were selected for study. Included were
three appeals from charges of homicide,9 two appeals arising from charges of
keeping a common gaming house,"0 two appeals in connection with theft,'
two appeals from charges of rape,' 2 one appeal from a charge of indecent
assault, 3 two obscenity appeal,' two appeals from charges in connection
with drugs,' 5 six appeals as to procedural matters at trial, 16 three appeals from
sentence,17 one appeal from a charge of assault,' 8 one appeal from a charge of
dangerous driving,' 9 one appeal from a charge of careless driving under the
Ontario Highway Traffic Act,20 one appeal from a charge of running a dis-
orderly house, 21 one appeal in connection with a search warrant,2 2 three
appeals arising under the federal Combines Investigation Act,2 and one
appeal each under the Ontario Construction Safety Act,24 the federal
Lord's Day Act,2 5 the federal Customs Act, 26 and the federal Migratory Birds
Convention Act.27
The Criminal Law table makes possible an examination of the effect of
the justices' votes on prosecutions brought by the Crown under the Criminal
Code and other legislation creating criminal offences. A vote favouring the
accused is designated as affirmative (+); whereas a vote favouring the
Crown is designated as negative (-).
The following observations can be made:
(a) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice Laskin may be described as
8 95% of the decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal are reported in the Ontario
Reports. The Reports were brought up to date by checking the files in the Secretary's
office of the Law Society of Upper Canada.
9 R. v. Black and Mackie, [1966] 1 O.R. 683; R. v. Hilson, (1958] 0. R. 665; R. v.
Lelievre, [1962] O.R. 522.
10 R. v. Kerim (1962), 38 C.R. 71; R. v. Tatti, [1966] 1 O.R. 379.
11 R. v. Simpson, [1959] O.R. 497; R. v. Wilkins, [1964] 2 O.R. 365.
12 R. v. Kribs, [1960] O.R. 184; R. v. Price and Hansen, June 17, 1968.
13 R. v. Maurantonio, [1968] 1 O.R. 145.
14 R. v. Cameron, [1966] 2 O.R. 777; R. v. Coles, [1965] 1 O.R. 557.
16 R. v. Michel, [1968] 2 O.R. 68; R. v. Cipolla, [1965] 2 O.R. 673.
16 R. v. De Clercq, [1966] 1 O.R. 674; R. v. McConnell, [1967] 2 O.R. 527;
R. v. Cooper, [1968] 1 O.R. 71; R. v. Horsburgh, [1966] 1 O.R. 739; R. v. Briden, [1960]
O.R. 362; R. v. Bezeau, [1958] O.R. 617.
17 R. v. Roberts, [1963] 1 O.R. 280; R. v. Watson, [1968] 1 0.R. 279; R. v. Varley,
[1959] O.R. 507.
18 R. v. Antley, [1964] 1 O.R. 545.
19 R. v. Bruno Peda, June 20, 1968.
20 R. v. Yolles, [1959] O.R. 206.
21 R. v. Patterson, [1967] 1 O.R. 429.
22 Re Worrall, [1965] 1 O.R. 527.
23 R. v. Beamish, [1968] 1 O.R. 5; R. v. Sunbeam, [1967] 1 O.R. 661; R. v.
Campbell, [1964] 2 O.R. 487.
24 R. v. Strand, June 4, 1968.
25 The Queen v. The C.B.C., [1958] O.R. 55.
26 R. v. Yuhasz, [1960] O.R. 251.
27 A.-G. of Canada v. George, [1964] 2 O.R. 429.
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highly pro-accused on the basis of 10 affirmative votes in 11 parti-
cipations (91% affirmative).
(b) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice McLennan may be described
as neutral on the basis of 7 affirmative votes in 15 participations
(47% affirmative).
(c) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice Schroeder may be described as
pro-Crown on the basis of 4 affirmative votes in 11 participations
36% affirmative).
(d) The voting behaviour of former Chief Justice Porter may be des-
cribed as highly pro-Crown on the basis of 4 affirmative votes in 18
participations (22% affirmative).
(e) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice MacKay may be described as






Alien 65 1 391
Odette 65 2 713
Board of Corn 62 948
Sinai 66 1 65
Glassman 66 2 81
Bank of Corn. 62 253
Arthurs 67 2 49
Feeley 62 872
Bums 65 2 768
Sandwich 61 185
Weiler 68 1 705
Colonial 67 2 243
Hirsch 60 554
McIntosh 61 474
Hoogendoom 67 1 712
O.LR.B. 67 2 469
Trans-Canada 63 2 41
Silverhill 68 1 357
Outdoor Neon 59 26
Chan 62 798
Seneca 63 2 439
O.M.L 60 38
+ 4 1 1
- 0 0 0
Participations 4 1 1
% Affirmative 100 100 100
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Twenty-two divided decisions in appeals arising from disputes between
an administrative agency and a private individual or entity were selected for
study. The decisions are reported in the 1958 to 1968 volumes of the Ontario
Reports. Included were five appeals from decisions of arbitration boards, 28
three appeals in connection with expropriation, 29 three appeals in connection
with assessment, 30 two appeals from deportation orders, 31 one appeal in
connection with succession duties,82 one appeal from a certification of a union
by the Ontario Labour Relations Board,"3 one appeal in connection with
procedure at an inquiry conducted by the Ontario Crime Commission, 34 one
appeal from a holding of the College of Physicians and Surgeons,8 5 one appeal
as to the Minister of National Revenue's right to require disclosure of
information under the federal Income Tax Act,36 one appeal in connection
with an application for an order of prohibition directed against the Ontario
Highway Transport Board,87 one appeal arising from an action by a township
Board of Police Commissioners,8  one appeal in connection with planning
legislation,89 and one appeal in connection with the Ontario Municipal
Board's validation of a municipal by-law. 40
The Administrative Law table makes possible an examination of the
effect of the justices' votes in disputes between an administrative agency and
a private individual or entity. A vote favouring the private individual or
entity is designated as affirmative (±), whereas a vote favouring the adminis-
trative agency is designated as negative (-).
The following obeservations can be made:
(a) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice McGillivray may be described
as in favour of the private individual or entity on the basis of 4
afrmative votes in 6 participations (67% affirmative).
(b) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice Schroeder may be described
as neutral on the basis of 5 affirmative votes in 12 participations
(42% affirmative).
(c) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice Laskin may be described as in
favour of the administrative agency on the basis of 2 affirmative
votes in 7 participations (29% affirmative).
28 Re Sandwich, [1961] O.R. 185; R. v. Arthurs, [1967] 2 O.R. 49; Re Hoogendoorn,
[1967] 1 O.R. 712; R. v. Weiler, [1968] 1 O.R. 705; Re Allen, [1965] 1 O.R. 391.29 Re Bums, [1965] 2 O.R. 768; Re. Silverhill, [1968] 1 O.R. 357; Re Sinai Day
Camp, [1966] 1 O.R. 65.
83ORe Ontario Motor League, [1960] O.R. 38; Trans-Canada Pipe Lines, [1963]
2 O.R. 41; Township of Seneca, [1963] 2 O.R. 439.
3l Chan v. McFarlane, [1962] O.R. 798; Ex Parte Hirsch, [1960] O.R. 554.
2Re Odette, [1965] 2 O.R. 713.
33 R. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, [1967] 2 O.R. 469.
34 Ex Parte Freeley, [1962] O.R. 872.
85 Re Glassman, [1966] 2 O.R. 81.
86 Canadian Bank of Commerce, [1962] O.R. 253.
37 Re Colonial Coach Lines, [1967] 2 O.R. 243.
88 Board of Commissioners of Police, [1962] O.R. 948.
89 Re Mcntosh, [1961] O.R. 474.
40 Re Outdoor Neon Displays, [1959] O.R. 26.
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(d) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice MacKay may be described as
highly in favour of the administrative agency on the basis of 1








Schofield 68 2 409






Bums 65 2 768
Crossman 66 2 712
Jennings 65 2 285
Colmenares 66 1 553
Allen 65 1 391




Park Motors 63 1 57
Foster 61 551
Wawanesa 61 495





Delta 66 2 37
Beylon 68 2 257
Powell 67 1 103
Royal Bank 67 2 379
Teasdale 67 2 169
Sutherland 68 1 175
Sniderman 67 1 321
Givens 59 53

















+ 9 5 2 1 1 4 4 8 5 3 6 5 1 1 0 0
- 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 6 4 8 8 3 8 3 1
Participations 9 5 2 1 1 5 6 14 11 7 14 13 4 9 3 1
= 105
% Affirmative 100 100 100 100 100 80 67 57 45 43 43 38 25 11 0 0
1969]
+
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Thirty-five cases of disputes between parties of unequal financial
resources were chosen for scrutiny. All appeals in the table involve disputes
between individuals and an institution or an insured individual. The outcome
of the action is critical to the individual's financial position, whereas it is
relatively insignificant to the institution because it has large resources or be-
cause any loss it suffers will be recovered by spreading it over a large sector
of the public in the form of increased prices or charges for the goods or
services. The appeals included in this table are reported in the 1958 to 1968
volumes of the Ontario Reports. It includes six appeals arising from claims for
damages in motor vehicle accidents, 42 five appeals in actions on insurance
policies,"3 two appeals in connection with a municipality's duty to repair high-
ways, 44 two appeals between financial institutions and their customers,45 two
appeals in connection with mechanics' liens, 46 two appeals arising from
actions for libel,47 two appeals in connection with real estate transactions, 48
and three appeals in connection with the sale of goods.' The remaining
appeals involve a dispute between a teacher and a school board, 50 an award
of indemnity to a third party,51 an action for damages for negligence against
police officers,52 a motion to construe a trust and will, 63 a dispute between
a company and its shareholders,5 4 and an award made in arbitration proceed-
ings,55 a dispute over a mortgage,56 a dispute over the authority of a com-
pany's agent,57 an action by an employee against his employer for wrongful
dismissal, 58 an action for damages brought by a passenger against a bus
company, 59 and an action in connection with expropriation.
60
The "Economic Underdog" table makes possible an examination of the
effect of the justices' votes in disputes between parties of unequal financial
41 S. R. Peck devised an economic underdog scale in a work yet to be published.
The criteria he used for his selection of cases have been used in the present selection.
42 Teasdale v. McIntyre, [1967] 2 O.R. 1969; Bandur v. Daikeu, [1967] O.R. 629;
Foster v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, [1961] O.R. 551; T.T.C. v. McKnight, [1958]
O.R. 219; Jennings v. Cronsberry, [1965] 2 O.R. 285; Carl v. McQueen, [1962] O.R. 224.
43 Colmenares, [19661 1 O.R. 553; Calverley, [1959] O.R. 253; Givens, [1959] O.R.
53; Oakley, [1958] O.R. 565; Hanes, [1951] O.R. 495.
44 Sutherland, [1968] 1 O.R. 175; Schofield, [1968] 2 O.R. 409.
45 Kiska, [1967] 2 O.R. 379; Redman, [1966] 2 O.R. 37.
46 Troup, [19611 O.R. 455; Peloso, [1958] O.R. 643.
47 Gaskin, [1964] 1 O.R. 530; Boland, [1961] O.R. 712.
48 Willoughby, [1958] O.R. 235; Lowe, [1962] O.R. 1029.
49 Park Motors, [1963] 1 O.R. 57; Jerome, [1958] O.R.; H. B. MeGinness, [1958]
O.R. 404.
50 Elliot, [1960] O.R. 583.
51 Powell Equipment, [1967] 1 O.R. 103.
52 Shynall, [1958] O.R. 7.
53 Re Blackwell, [1962] O.R. 832.
54 Re International Petroleum, [1962] O.R. 705.
55 Re Allen, [1965] 1 O.R. 391.
56 Re Beylon, [1968] 2 O.R. 257.
57 Sniderman, [1967] 1 O.R. 321.
58 Crossman, [1966] 2 O.R. 712.
59 Ireson, [1960] O.R. 661.
60 Re Bums, [1965] 2 O.R. 768.
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resources-between an individual and an institution or an insured individual.
A vote favouring the individual or the economic underdog is designated as
affirmative (+), whereas a vote favouring the institution or insured individual
is designated as negative (-).
The following observations can be made:
(a) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice Laskin may be described as
highly in favour of the individual on the basis of 9 affirmative votes
in 9 participations (100% affirmative).
(b) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice Shroeder may be described as
neutral on the basis of 8 affirmative votes in 14 pajticipations (57%
affirmative).
(c) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice McGillivray may be described
as neutral on the basis of 5 affirmative votes in 11 participations
(45% affirmative).
(d) The voting behaviour of Mr. Justice MacKay may be described as
neutral on the basis of 6 affirmative votes in 14 participations (43%
affirmative).
(e) The voting behaviour of former Chief Justice Porter may be des-
cribed as in favour of the institution or insured individual on the
basis of 5 affirmative votes in 13 participations (38% affirmative).
(f) The voting behaviour of former Mr. Justice Laidlaw may be des-
cribed as highly in favour of the institution or the insured individual
on the basis of 1 affirmative vote in 9 participations (11% affirma-
tive).
Conclusion: Post Mortem and Prognosis
By examining a justice's voting division in a particular group of cases, it
was found to be possible to describe the effect of the justice's votes. The
foregoing observations indicate that some justices consistently support or
oppose the claims of the accused in criminal appeals, the private individual in
administrative appeals and the individual in "economic-underdog" appeals.
In summary, it is submitted that, although the initial effort to apply the
scalogram analysis technique to the investigation of the work of the Ontario
Court of Appeal did not meet with success, the study of the justices' voting
divisions in a particular group of cases is one which has exposed a fertile area
for further research. The design of any further research, however, must
accommodate the Court's idiosyncrasies.
I VOTING PATTERNS ON THE ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL
An attempt will be made in this section of the paper to describe and
comment on some of the more salient features of intra court voting patterns.
Many of the observations will be based on assumptions made in the previous
section of this paper. Once again the reader should keep in mind the fact that
the Court of Appeal sits in panels of three chosen out of a possible ten
1969]
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judges. In certain cases the panels consist of five judges, but these occur very
seldom over the period reviewed in this paper. They are convened ad hoc to
hear special cases. In general, however, discussion here will focus on the
customary three-member panel.
The leading studies on intra-court voting patterns treat voting groups as
analytic constructs rather than as empirically established entities. In an
attempt to look at particular data in a certain way, certain members of a
court are grouped according to commonly-shared attitudes towards certain
types of underlying policy issues present in specific types of cases. A like
attitude to certain issues is the common basis of all voting studies.
Among students of judicial behaviour, no one has suggested, nor would
anyone venture to suggest that, in general, intra-court groups manifest a
cohesiveness for reasons other than the fact that they vote together. To
indicate the contrary one would have to show a very high degree of extra-
curial activity and present some evidence that the group systematically
caucused together. This has been established with a relative degree of cer-
tainty only in one instance.
61
Schubert maintains that a bloc consists of three or more justices who
manifest a relatively high degree of interagreement in their voting whether in
majority or in dissent over a period of at least a term. 62 A bloc is considered
different from a group; the latter consists of a temporary alignment of justices
who vote together in a particular case or set of cases. The group lacks both
the persistency and the consistency of a bloc. Cliques and tactical groups are
more graphic terms used to describe the above distinction.
The greatest part of the literature on intra-court voting deals mainly with
the Supreme Court of the United States. One of the best known blocs to
function to the United States Supreme Court within recent years was the bloc
identified as the "Libertarian Activists. '68 This bloc was composed of Black,
Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge and it functioned over a period of six terms
-from 1943 to 1949. This bloc was identified by examining the extent to
which the justices who sat on the Vinson Court favoured libertarian claims
dealing with selected civil liberties issues.
An objective way of identifying blocs is to construct tables in which
the paired voting agreement in split decisions is determined for each justice
with every other both in dissent and for dissenting and assenting votes com-
bined. From this it is possible to measure the degree of a bloc in dissent and
the degree of its interagreement when both majority and dissenting votes
are combined.64 However, for reasons set out below, methods for bloc study
work best when applied to a court which is constituted like the U.S. Supreme
Court where all members sit to hear all cases and vote together to reach a
decision. Table IV, infra, is an attempt to approximate the application of
such methods to the Ontario Court of Appeal. It will be discussed later in
the paper.
61 Schubert, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, 155-161.
62 Id., at 155.
63 Pritchett, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT, 190-192.
64 For further methods of bloc study, see Schubert, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR, 77-91.
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In a court structured like the Ontario Court of Appeal, it is difficult, if
not unrealistic, to speak of a bloc in the way Pritchett and Schubert speak
of a bloc. With respect to non-unanimous decisions, of the three judges on the
panel, only two can maniest any degree of interagreement while the third will
be cast in the role of a dissenter. When one further considers that panels to
hear criminal and civil cases are not constant but are selected from a pool
of ten judges, it becomes apparent that there will be a fundamental problem
in trying to identify a single pair of judges who may have a high degree of
interagreement because of like attitudes towards certain issues.
There is very little published information on the internal workings of
the Court of Appeal and, as well can be understood, members of the Court
are reticent to talk about the Court during the course of informal discussions.
Generally, it is known that the civil and criminal panels for each month are
chosen on the 15th day of the preceding month by the Chief Justice. It was
suggested to the writers that the panels were selected primarily on the basis
of maintaining an even distribution of the work load among all the members
of the court. Of course, on any panel, a factor in the selection of a judge
would be his availability on a regular basis for that month. Certain judges
might occasionally have to be present in chambers to hear motions or par-
ticular appeals, might be required in another part of the province to hear a
special matter, or just would not be available in the month for one reason or
another. One might say, though, that one would expect all the members of
the court to participate equally with slight variations for unforeseen factors
such as long term illness.
To begin with, therefore, certain specific statements can be made about
the selection of one of the two panels for the month. Assuming all justices
are available for selection to the criminal panel,65 the number of judges that
will be available to sit on the panel will be ten. The commonest panel size is
three. Assuming all members are given an equal opportunity to sit on one of
the two panels throughout the year one would not expect to find any overt
preference in panel selection.
At any rate, if all possible combinations of three justices from ten are
equally likely to be chosen, then the probability of any given set of three
being chosen is 1 chance in 120. The figure may be affected by giving the
Chief Justice discretion to sit as often as he wishes on certain panels through-
out the year, thereby increasing or decreasing his participation beyond what
one expects. However, in developing this area, it will be assumed that this
is not the case and the factor we are talking about is 1/120.
Given all possible combinations of panels of three, one observes that
once the first two justices are selected for a panel there remains only 8 men
from which to choose. Therefore, the expected participation of any two par-
ticular judges in a series of cases is, on the average, every eighth case.
65 This panel may be chosen first because of the relative importance of criminal
appeals in the appellate jurisdiction and because they form the largest single group of
cases considered by the court.
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Having set out the schedule for the frequency of which one would
expect certain patterns in the court to appear, a qualification must be made
with reference to certain of the data compiled for this study. One cannot say
that the probability of any three or any two judges is likely to occur since
not all judges have been members of the court during the ten year period
studied. Their participation should be weighted by determining the fraction
of the total period which they served on the court. Furthermore, since the
number of split decisions per year is neither equally nor randomly distributed,
but appear to increase in numbers in the later years,66 it is difficult for one
to weight the probability of a judge's participation solely by relation to his
tenure on the course; the factor of increasing dissents must be related in some
way to the increasing number of cases per year and dealt with in some way
before anything significant or at least reasonably accurate can be said about
intra-court voting patterns.
Acknowledging certain limitations in the treatment of the partial data
compiled, it is the purpose of this section of the paper to inquire about the
relation between expected participation between pairs of justices, that which
is revealed by the data, and the rate of interagreement between certain pairs
of judges.
The basic data consist of all the non-unanimous decisions of the Court
of Appeal from November, 1958, to November, 1968, as reported in the
Ontario Reports. The publishers of these reports stated that all such decisions
were usually included in these reports so that it is reasonable to assume that
only a small number were actually overlooked. In each case the votes of the
participants were scored in relation to each other. A matrix was constructed
which listed all the judges who have sat on the court during any part of the
ten year period. Then for each pair of judges it was determined how many
times they sat and voted together. Similar matrices were constructed for only
the 1965-1968 period and for all the criminal, administrative law and
"economic underdog" cases over the period in which there were split decisions.
In interpreting the data certain assumptions were adhered to. Although
two panels sat concurrently, on the basis of equal work load distribution, it
was assumed that all things being equal one would expect a member of the
court to appear on any panel as frequently as any other member. Since the
ratio of criminal to civil non-unanimous decisions in this period was 1:2,
one might expect a pair of judges to participate in only one-third as many
criminal cases as all the cases compiled. The ratio of 1:2 possibly corresponds
to the relative length of time to hear criminal as opposed to civil appeals on
the average or, perhaps, criminal cases present clearer alternatives in policy
choices. During the 1965-1968 period approximately two-fifths of the split
decisions for the entire ten-year period were reported: this must be considered
also in determining the expected participation. One further caveat: owing to
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the fact that the non-unanimous decisions may not be randomly distributed,
this factor may further qualify anything that is said below.
Participation
Only four judges served on the court over the entire ten year period-
Aylesworth, Schroeder, Mackay and McGillivray. One would expect that if
the panels were selected without any predetermined considerations governing
the selection procedure, then any pair of these four judges should occur on
the average of every eighth time and accordingly that each pair should




Ayl .......................... 5 5 1
M ac ........................ 12 9
Sch .......................... 15
Table V indicates that Schroeder and McGillivray sat together as often
as one might expect. Schroeder and MacKay sat together only slightly less
than one would expect. Aylesworth participated with these judges much less
than one would expect. Over the ten year period he in fact participated with
any one judge only five times in the non-unanimous decisions, one third of
what one might expect. His participations were primarily with members who
joined the court at about the same time he did. Length of membership on
the court might therefore determine, in part, panel composition. However,
Laidlaw, who joined the court in 1943 and left in 1963, had thirty-one
participations in all, nineteen of which were with Schroeder.
The late Mr. Justice Porter sat on the Court up until September 1967.




Por .................... 28 16
M ac .................. 12
Table VI indicates that Porter sat with MacKay and Schroeder more
often than one would expect if the 120 cases under study were randomly
distributed over the ten year interval, assuming, of course, that the issue of
deciding how to vote would not arise until after the appeal had been heard.
As far as panel selection and the participation of any two judges on a panel
is concerned, equal distribution of work may not have been the only factor
67 See Appendix 2, infra.
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operative in panel selection while Porter was Chief Justice. However, since
these non-unanimous decisions represent only a small fraction of the total
cases decided and because their distribution may be unequal, especially after
1956, no definite statements on the matter can be made without actually
examining the panel lists for this period.
68
We have attempted up to this point to set a limit, reasonably arrived at,
to the pairs of justices who would be discussed in relation to their degree of
interagreement. If one is to expect a "yes" or "no" response to any issue
presented in a specific case, then all that remains is to determine whether
certain pairs of justices agreed or disagreed with each other more than fifty
per cent of the time when a policy issue arose. Examined first will be all the
cases over 1958-68, then the Criminal law cases, the Administrative law
cases, the "economic underdog" cases, the general cases and those cases since
1965.
Civil: Criminal Cases
In the 28 instances Porter sat with MacKay he agreed with him seventy-
five per cent of the time. However, Porter agreed with Schroeder only twenty-
five per cent of the time. This does show that in a significantly large number
of cases, overall, in which there were split decisions, Porter and MacKay
combined to outvote the third member of the panel, whomever he was,
seventy-five per cent of the time. The number of cases heard by this pair
represents twenty-three per cent of the cases considered.
There were thirty-five criminal cases over the ten year period under
study in which there was a split decision. Porter and MacKay sat together
on thirteen of these cases and their rate of interagreement was eighty-five per
cent. Together they wrote the majority opinions in over one-third of the non-
unanimous decisions. 69
McGillivray and Schroeder sat together on fifteen of the cases overall
and agreed over seventy-three per cent of the time. They sat together on
only three criminal cases but their rate of concurrence was one hundred per
cent. In civil cases it dropped to around sixty-six per cent.
TABLE VII
SPLIT DECISIONS SINCE MARCH 1965
Criminal Civil All
Total Cases .......................... 18 28 46
Laskin participations ............ 11 17 28
Laskin Dissents .................... 10 15 25
68 There is a list on file in the Registrar's Office of the Court of Appeal showing the
composition of the monthly panels from 1956 to the present. This material is con-
sidered to be confidential and private.
69 See Appendix 2, infra.
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Table VII above indicates that the rate of split decisions increased
significantly since the spring of 1965. This date also marked what was
considered by many to be a dramatic appointment to the Court of Appeal,
namely that of Bora Laskin. Laskin was the sole dissenter or joined in
dissent (five member panels) in fifty-six per cent of the total of these cases.
His rate of dissent in the cases he heard was ninety per cent. In respect of
participation and dissent, Laskin was extremely active.
By calculating the ratio of the period Laskin sat to the total period and
allowing for the increased volume of cases, assuming random distribution,
one would have expected Laskin to have participated relatively few times
with any other justice. But it was owing to his dissent that the distribution of
split decisions changed enormously. There is no other single factor to account
for the large number of split decisions in which Laskin participated other
than that Laskin participated. His appearance on the court did tend to
confirm, however, the voting patterns between other pairs of justices.70
For instance, MacKay and Porter over a two year period voted together
seventy-two per cent of the time while the interagreement rate of McGillivray
and Schroeder continued to hover about the sixty-six per cent mark.
TABLE VIII
RATE OF DISSENT ON PANELS OF THREE BY INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Judge Rate %
L askin ...................................................................... 78.5
L eB el ...................................................................... 55.0
Laidlaw .................................................................... 45.2
W ells ........................................................................ 43.1
M orden .................................................................... 37.5
Schroeder ................................................................ 36.7
M cGillivray .............................................................. 32.3
M acK ay .................................................................. 26.7
K elly ........................................................................ 15.8
R oach ...................................................................... 15.6
Evans ...................................................................... 14.4
G ibson .................................................................... 9.1
Porter ...................................................................... 7.1
Aylesworth .............................................................. 6.0
M cLellan ................................................................ 4 0
Jessup ...................................................................... 0
70 See Appendix 3, infra.
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TABLE IX
TENURE ON COURT OF JUDGES WHO SAT BETWEEN 1958-68
Judge Date Joined Date Left (indicates still on)
Aylesworth Oct. 30, 1946
Gibson Jan. 18, 1950 Sept. 1, 1965
Laidlaw Feb. 14, 1943 Sept. 29, 1963
LeBel Oct. 10, 1956 Nov. 1, 1960
MacKay Aug. 27, 1952
McGillivray Dec. 13, 1957
Morden Oct. 25, 1957 July 14, 1961
Roach Oct. 6, 1944 Mar. 31, 1965
Schroeder Mar. 2, 1955
McLennan Oct. 19, 1961
Kelly Dec. 19, 1960
Gale Oct. 31, 1963 July 1, 1964
Wells Jne. 18, 1964 Sept. 21, 1967 C.J.H.C.
Evans Aug. 20, 1965
Laskin Aug. 20, 1965
Jessup Sep. 21, 1967
(Gale became C.J.O. on September 21, 1967.
Porter died September 21, 1967.)
In this same period Laskin sat with McLennan fourteen times, with
MacKay twelve times, with Schroeder nine, and Kelly eight times. He voted
opposite to MacKay and Kelly one hundred per cent of the time. He agreed
with McLennan and Schroeder only one time each. In contrast to this, Mac-
Kay and McLennan sat together ten times and agreed with each other eighty
per cent of the time.
Of the eighteen criminal appeals over the 1965-68 period, Laskin
participated with McLennan in nine and with Schroeder in eight; in other
words, Laskin sat with MacKay and McLennan together in about half of
the cases. In only one case did he join with one other member (McLennan)
to write the majority opinion.
Over the total ten year period MacKay and McLennan sat together on
one-third of the criminal appeals where a split vote was registered and voted
together sixty per cent of the time. They sat on only three civil cases during
the period and voted together twice.
There is nao way of confirming the relative activity of a MacKay-
McLennan-Laskin panel to another panel over the last few years except by
looking at panel lists. However, that particular combination has prompted
Laskin to dissent seven out of ten times he dissented; it might, however, be
machiavellian to suggest that the number of dissents could be controlled
either by seating Laskin with someone with whom he can agree or, at least,
with a person who cannot agree with either of MacKay or MeLennan.
As indicated above, during the 1965-68 period, Laskin was the most
active dissenter, or, at least, he dissented frequently with members of the
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court who were very much his seniors in terms of tenure. However, two other
members joined the court at about the same time as Laskin, Wells and Jessup.
In relatively few non-unanimous cases where Laskin sat with one or the
other, he did vote with them on the average over sixty per cent of the time.
More specifically he voted with Jessup two out of two times and with Wells
three out of five times. In this same interval Wells participated with MacKay
twice but failed to vote with him on either occasion. Jessup also failed to vote
with MacKay the one time they sat together. The pattern changes slightly
with regard to McLennan: Wells sat with him three times and voted with
him twice, whereas Jessup as yet has not participated on a case with McLen-
nan where there was a non-unanimous decision. There is no way of telling
whether he would join with Laskin to outvote McLennan in a specific case
involving a certain policy issue from the present data. Since Wells departed
to become Chief Justice of the High Court in September 1967, the future
voting patterns between Laskin and Jessup take on added interest.
Up to this point discussion has centred around voting patterns in the
criminal appeals. These cases have formed the largest specific segment of
the total cases considered.
"Economic Underdog" Cases
In the series of cases referred to earlier in the paper as the "economic
underdog" cases, Porter and MacKay sat together five times but concurred
only once, a rate (20%) which is considerably below their interagreement
overall and very much lower than their interagreement in criminal cases.
71
A Schroeder and MacKay combination occurred in only three out of
thirty-four cases. They voted together twice but the number of responses is
too infrequent to make any statement about their rate of interagreement.
McGillivray and Schroeder participated together in four cases and
voted in agreement three times.
Laskin, whose participation in these cases is really a function of his
rate of dissent, heard nine of these cases and dissented each time. He voted
opposite to MacKay three times; four with McGillivray and three with
McLennan.
Porter and Schroeder sat together on eight of these cases and voted in
agreement only once. This is consistent with their overall rate.
Administrative Law Cases
In the series of cases identified as involving a narrow or wide attitude
toward judicial review, which we have referred to for convenience as the
"administrative law" cases, the average participation per pairs of judges is
three cases which is about what one would expect7 2
The figures gathered here confirm a high rate of interagreement between
Porter and MacKay (100%); and Schroeder and McGillivray (80%). The
71 See Appendix 4, infra.
72 See Appendix 5, infra.
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participation of these two pairs combined was somewhat above the average
(8 cases). Together they participated in one third of the administrative law
cases.
Laskin and Schroeder compiled a low rate of interagreement: in the
criminal law area, on the basis of three cases, it was 0 per cent. Here, they
sat together five times and disagreed with each other eighty per cent of the
time. Laskin also disagreed with Porter three out of three times. He did
not sit with MacKay on any of these cases but he did sit twice and disagreed
twice with McLennan which is consistent with his voting patterns in the
criminal and "economic underdog" series of cases.
Since Laskin joined the court in 1965 he participated in seven of the
ten Administraitve Law cases and dissented in fifty per cent of them. This
rate of dissent is about twice that for any other member of the court in this
area. As explained earlier, in attempting to scale the administrative law
cases, a negative vote was given to a justice who voted to dismiss an appeal
from a board or administrative tribunal; this vote was interpreted to mean
the member favoured narrow judicial review. Whether to classify this tendency
as liberal or conservative presents something of a dilemma. Although in the
"scale" it seems as if Porter and MacKay would be on the same side of a
liberal-conservative continuum as Laskin, it seems ironic to place Porter and
Laskin together in view of the fact they disagreed with each other in the
four cases in which they jointly participated during the period. Since Laskin
appears to be more liberal than Porter or MacKay on the basis of statements
made about other "scales", it might be reasonable to suggest that a narrow
attitude toward judicial review is an element in liberalness and, since Laskin
may have more of these liberal traits than Porter or MacKay, he should be
placed closer to the liberal pole than either.
"Non-Policy" Cases
The statements made above concerning criminal law, administrative law
and "economic underdog" cases, indicate a consensus or lack of consensus
between certain judges regarding implicit policy issues presented by those
cases. This conclusion can be reinforced somewhat by examining what might
be called the "general" or "non-policy" cases decided over the ten year period
with which this study is concerned. Either because the issues are so diverse or
because the policy demands placed on the judges are rather weak, one might
expect to encounter more eclectic voting patterns by the judges and lower
interagreement between pairs of judges who in other areas exhibited a high
degree of interagreement, or vice versa.78
Most of these cases were heard prior to Laskin's arrival on the court
and the participations were spread out over a wide number of judges. No pair
of judges participate more often than one would expect on the basis of the
frequency of selection stated above.
No significant statements can be made about any of the pairs of justices
with which this paper is concerned. McGillivray sat with MacKay four times
73 See Appendix 6, infra.
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and disagreed with him each time. This disagreement could have been
prompted for any number of reasons, any one of which might bear no
relationship to their disagreement in other areas.
There is no evidence of consensus or lack of it between MacKay and
Schroeder, Porter and MacKay, Porter and Schroeder or between McGillivray
and Porter. Of interest are the high dissent rates of Roach and Laidlaw with
MacKay and Schroeder respectively. Since they do not figure prominently in
the ten year period being considered, their voting patterns should be con-
sidered by the reader at his leisure. Laidlaw's high rate of disagreement with
Schroeder might be looked at more closely over a period which was co-
terminous with both their tenures on the court. The same might be true of
the relationship between LeBel and Roach on the one hand and MacKay
on the other. If space permitted, it might also be interesting to observe how
Laidlaw, LeBel and Roach would have voted if they had sat on the same
panel as Laskin, and to speculate whether they were a liberal or conservative
group on the court. The fact that they had little interagreement is, however,
somewhat of a spoiling factor.
Conclusion
Because only four judges have been on the court over the entire ten
year period with which this study deals, it is difficult to speak of a bloc
consisting of three or more justices with any degree of certainty. Table X
is an attempt to delineate, mutatis mutandis, the rough structure of a possible
group of blocs over the ten year period.
It was stated earlier that one might expect any pair of judges to appear
in a series of 120 randomly distributed cases about fifteen times over a
ten year interval if the panels were selected without a conscious view to
seating together certain pairs of judges. It was intended by this statement
to arbitrarily designate certain pairs of justices about whom one might make
some remarks with more confidence than one would for others. The factors
behind panel selection are a separate but important area for study which
unfortunately cannot be dealt with in this paper. With the exception of
Porter and Mackay, most of the other pairs of justices discussed participated
as often as one might expect. Porter's greater participation with MacKay
might have been nothing more than the prerogative which is commonly
exercised by the Chief Justice to utilize "his discretion". Tables XI, XII and
XIJI below indicate the percentage of interagreement between the five most
frequently-occurring pairs of judges in all cases, in criminal cases and in civil




























































PERCENTAGE INTERAGREEMENT BETWEEN PAIRS OF JUSTICES IN ALL CASES
Pair %
Por - Mac 75
McG - Sch 73
McG - Por 44
Mac - Sch 42
Por - Sch 25
TABLE XII
INTERAGREEMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES
Pair %
Por - Mac 84
McG - Sch 100
McG - Por 66
Mac - Sch 60
Por - Sch 43
TABLE XIII
INTERAGREEMENT IN CIVIL CASES (INCLUDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND ECONOMIC UNDERDOG CASES).
Pair %
Por - Mac 66
McG - Sch 66
McG - Por 33
Mac - Sch 60
Por - Sch 11
Porter and MacKay were nearly as consistent in their agreement in
criminal cases. Their participation was about twice what one might expect over
this period.
McGillivray and Schroeder had a very high overall rate of agreement
but it was somewhat artificially buoyed up by their low participation together
in criminal cases.
TABLE XIV
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Porter and Schroeder agreed relatively infrequently in these specific
cases. Their participation together was about what one might expect. It
would seem that in a case involving a specific policy issue on a panel con-
sisting of Porter, MacKay and Schroeder, the latter would be in the minority
a great deal of the time. On checking through all the cases reviewed, it was
found that Porter and MacKay outvoted the third member of the panel
eighteen times. Their apparent agreement on matters cannot be contested.
With Porter of course gone from the court, the most likely person to exhibit
the same high degree of interagreement with MacKay would be McGillivray.
The future role of Mackay and McGillivray vis-a-vis Laskin should be one
of the more important features of the court for lawyers and students of the
court to observe. Any observer should also be aware of the potential implica-
tions in a decision in which Laskin and Jessup are participating together. If
this occurs frequently, the mantle of the dissenter may suddenly descend on
some other worthy recipient.




0o ~ . ~0 C 0 as ) ~ C
Laidlaw S 2 2 12 9 (19) (8) 3 (8) 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
V 0 1 6 2 (2)(1) 1 (1) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Roach S 1 6 (12) 4 5 1 2 4 (5) 4 0 0 0 0 0
V 1 2(1)3 2 1 0 2 (5) 2 0 0 0 0 0
Aylesworth
S 3 5 5 0 0 1 2 2 2 4 0 1 0 0
V 3 1 3 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 0
Gibson S 5 (10) 1 1 3 3 2 6 0 0 0 0 0
V 3(3) 1 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
Mackay S 12 11 2 (9) 6 15 (28)(12) 2 1 1 0
V 5 0 0 (0) 4 9 (21)(0) 0 1 0 0
Schroeder S 4 3 (15) 5 6 (16) (9) 3 1 0 2
V 1 2 (11) 1 3 (4) (1) 2 1 0 0
Lebel S I 1 0 0 (8) 0 0 0 0 0
V 1 0 0 0 (2) 0 0 0 0 0
Morden S 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0, 0
V 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
McGillivray
S 2 5 9 4 2 2 3 1
V 0 2 4 0 1 0 2 1
Kelly S 4 2 (8) 0 1 0 0
V 3 2 (0) 0 1 0 0
McLennanS 6 (14) 3 1 0 0
V 4(1) 2 1 0 0
Porter S 4 1 1 0 1
V 0 0 1 0 1
Laskin S 5 4 0 0
V 3 0 0 0
Wells S 1 0 0
V 0 0 0






TOTAL CAsEs = 120
APPENDIX 1: Number of times seated together (s) and number of times voted together
(V) in all non-unanimous decisions 1958-1968.
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0Cd l . 'as0
.< P 0 34 c52 ptuo, 1)
Laidlaw S 1 2 2 3 4 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2V 0 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Roach S 0 3 4 3 2 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 4
V 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
Aylesworth S 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1
V 1 I 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1
Gibson S 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
V 1 I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Mackay S (5) 4 1 2 1 (12) 2 1 (8) 1 (13)
V (3) 0 0 0 0 (7) 0 1 (0) 0 (11)
Schroeder S 3 1 3 2 4 1 0 3 0 1
V 1 1 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 3
Lebel S 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Morden S 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
McGillivray S 0 2 1 0 1 1 3
V 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
Kelly S 0 0 0 1 0 1
V 0 0 0 0 0 1
McLennan S 2 0 (9) 0 5
V 2 0 (1) 0 3
Wells S 1 2 0 1
V 0 1 0 0
Evans S 1 0 1
V 0 0 1






ToTAL CAsEs = 35
APPENDIX 2: Number of times seated together (S) and number of times voted together




























(10) 3 (11) (3) 4 1
(8) 2 (8) (3) 0 1
(5) 4 2 3 1
(4) 2 2 2 1
(4) 1 (6) 2








TOTAL CASES = 46
APPENuix 3: Number of times seated together (S) and number of times voted together
(V) in all non-unanimous decisions, 1965-1968.
Supreme Court Review 51
-43



























58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 7, NO. 1
4 I-
Laidlaw S 0 0 2 2 (5) (3) 1 (4) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
V 000 0(0)(0)0(1)1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roach S 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
V 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aylesworth S 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gibson S 1 3 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
V I 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Mackay S 3 (3) 1 2 2 1 0 0 (3) 0 (5)
V 2 (0) 0 0 2 1 0 0 (0) 0 (3)
Schroeder S 0 2 (4) 2 0 0 0 1 0 5
V 0 1 (3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Lebel S 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
V 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Morden S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
McGillivray S 1 0 1 1 2 1 1
V 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Kelly S 1 0 0 (4) 0 1
V 1 0 1 (0) 0 1
McLennan S 0 1 (3) 0 0
V 0 1 (0) 0 0
Wells S 0 1 0 0
V 0 1 0 0
Evans S 2 1 0
V 0 0 0






TOTAL CASES = 34
APPENDIX 4: Number of times tseated together (S) and number of times voted together




































(3) 2 3 0
(2) 0 1 0
3 2 0 1
1 0 0 0
(2) 0 (2) 0












TOTAL CASES = 25
A1Pmmix 5: Number of times seated together (S) and number of times voted together
(V) in all non-unanimous Administrative Law cases, 1958-1968.
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0 0 (5) 2 5 (3)
0 0 (3) 1 1 (0)
1 0 (4) 1 2
0 0 (1) 1 1
0 (3) 0 0







TOTAL CAsEs = 26
APPENDIX 6: Number of times seated together (S) and number of times voted together
(V) in all non-unanimous "Non-Policy" cases, 1958-1968.
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